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THE FUTURE OF SOFT MONEY IN FEDERAL ELECTIONS:  THE 527
REFORM ACT OF 2005 AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Ryan P. Chase*
Did we expect when we passed campaign finance reform that there would be this kind
of loophole exploited?  I have to tell you, we were a bit naive.
Senator John McCain, press conference on the 527 Reform Act
(Feb. 2, 2005), commenting on the impact 527 organizations
had on the 2004 federal elections.1
[Punxsutawney] Phil came out this morning and saw his shadow.  Well, I see a lot of
shadows in these 527s.  And I am very concerned about what it’s going to do to politics
in America.  I think it’s going to be abusive, I think it’s going to be negative, I think it’s
going to be sewer money, and I don’t think we can tolerate it.
Senator Trent Lott, press conference on the 527 Reform Act
(Feb. 2, 2005), speaking on Groundhog Day on the perceived
dangers behind soft money channeled through 527s.2
INTRODUCTION
President George W. Bush signed the Bipartisan Campaign Finance
Reform Act of 2002 (“BCRA”) into law on March 27, 2002, and when it
became law on November 6, 2002,3 BCRA marked the first significant
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4. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972), amended by
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 123 (1974).
5. 2 U.S.C. § 441i (Supp. II 2002).
6. The Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) defines soft money as:
funds raised and/or spent outside the limitations and prohibitions of the Federal Election Campaign
Act.  Sometimes referred to as nonfederal funds, soft money often includes corporate and/or labor
treasury funds, and individual contributions in excess of the federal limits, which cannot legally be
used in connection with federal elections, but can be used for other purposes.
FED. ELECTION COMM’N, TWENTY YEAR REPORT 23 (1995), available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/
20year.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2005).
7. See Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972), amended by Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 123 (1974).
As originally passed in 1972, FECA required disclosure of all contributions exceeding $100 and of
expenditures by candidates and political action committees that spent more than $1,000 per year.
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 117-18 (2003).  The 1974 amendments limited political contributions to
any single candidate to $1,000 per election, with an overall annual limitation of $25,000 by any contributor.
Id. at 118.  FECA, as amended recently by BCRA, prohibits national party committees and their agents
from soliciting, receiving, directing, or spending any soft money.  2 U.S.C. § 441i(a).
8. 148 CONG. REC. S298 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 2001) (statement of Senator McCain).
9. Statement on Signing the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 38 WKLY. COMPILATION
PRESIDENTIAL DOC. 517, 518 (Mar. 27, 2002).
10. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 93.  A total of eighty-four plaintiffs included parties from both sides
of the nation’s political divide and some very strange bedfellows such as the American Civil Liberties
Union, the National Rifle Association, the Republican National Committee, and the National Right to Life
Committee.  Id.  Furthermore, Senator McConnell enlisted high-profile attorneys Kenneth W. Starr and
Floyd Abrams, an experienced First Amendment litigator, to argue before the Supreme Court.  Id.
11. Id.
revision of the federal laws controlling the financing of campaigns for federal
office since the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”).4  Title I
of BCRA banned national parties and officeholders from raising and spending
“soft money.”5  Soft money can be defined simply as contributions that are not
subject to FECA’s contribution regulations while “hard money” refers to
contributions that do fall under FECA’s domain.6  FECA established a series
of mandatory limits on contributions to candidates and mandatory ceilings on
expenditures.7  Senator John McCain (R-AZ), one of the bill’s co-sponsors
who has fought for significant campaign finance reform for more than half a
decade, hoped the law would “restore the public’s faith in government.”8
President Bush hailed BCRA by stating that “[a]ll of the American electorate
will benefit from these measures to strengthen our democracy.”9
However, Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY) spearheaded a First
Amendment challenge to BCRA on the basis that the statute unconstitutionally
restricted freedom of speech by regulating soft money political donations and
advertising for federal elections.10  On December 10, 2003, the Supreme Court
upheld most of the key provisions of BCRA in McConnell v. FEC.11  In a five-
to-four decision, the Court ruled that the two principal features of BCRA, its
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12. Id. at 224.
13. Of the two major parties’ spending, soft money accounted for 5% ($21.6 million) in 1984, 11%
($45 million) in 1988, 16% ($80 million) in 1992, 30% ($272 million) in 1996, and 42% ($498 million)
in 2000.  Id. at 124.
14. See CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, 527S IN 2004 SHATTER PREVIOU S RECORDS FOR POLITICAL
FUNDRAISING (Dec. 16, 2004), at http://www.publicintegrity.org/527/report.aspx?aid=435&sid=300 (last




18. Bill McConnell, McCain Goes to Battle; Senator Tackles Campaign-finance Reform, BROAD.
& CABLE, Jan. 10, 2005, at 16.
19. Press Conference on 527 Reform Act, supra note 1.
regulation of electioneering communications and Congress’s effort to plug
soft money loopholes, did not violate the First Amendment and must be
upheld.12  As a result of BCRA and the McConnell decision, the tremendous
amount of soft money previously raised and spent by the national parties and
federal officeholders was eliminated from the campaign finance arena.13
Despite the significant campaign finance reforms effected by BCRA, soft
money still played a significant role in the 2004 federal elections.14  Because
BCRA banned national parties and officeholders from raising and spending
soft money, more unregulated money flowed into and was spent by “527”
nonprofit organizations than in any previous federal election cycle.15  These
organizations, nicknamed after § 527 of the Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”),
became a prime alternative for unions, interest groups, and wealthy
individuals who in previous elections donated unlimited amounts of cash
directly to the Republican and Democratic parties.16  Groups organized under
§ 527 alone spent over $339 million between July and November 2004 before
the presidential election and a total of $550 million during the entire 2004
election cycle.17  The pro-GOP “Swift Boat Veterans for Truth” and the anti-
Bush “Media Fund” were perhaps the most recognizable of these groups
because each aired a series of controversial ads during the presidential
campaign.18
In response to what they perceived as a gaping loophole in BCRA
exploited by § 527 groups during the 2004 elections, Senators John McCain
(R-AZ), Russell Feingold (D-WI), Trent Lott (R-MS), and Charles Schumer
(D-NY), along with Representatives Christopher Shays (R-CT) and Martin
Meehan (D-MA), introduced the “527 Reform Act of 2005” on February 2,
2005.19  The proposed 527 Reform Act would require § 527 groups to register
as political action committees (“PACs”) with the Federal Election
Commission (“FEC”) and would subject them to federal campaign laws under
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20. Id.
21. See generally Amy Keller, Campaign Finance to Return to Agenda in 109th, ROLL CALL,
Nov. 17, 2004 (discussing new campaign finance reform legislation and its inevitable constitutional
challenges), available at http://www.campaignlegalcenter.org/press-1385.html.
22. Id.; see also Glen Justice, Concerns Grow About Role of Interest Groups in Elections, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 8, 2005, at A20 (discussing the various § 527 and § 501(c) organizations that intend to
challenge the 527 Reform Act on First Amendment grounds) [hereinafter Concerns Grow].
23. 527 Reform Act of 2005, S. 271, 109th Cong. § 5 (2005).  The judicial review provision
provides that any constitutional claim must be filed in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia and will be heard by a three-judge panel in an expedited manner.  Id.  Furthermore, any appeal
from the panel’s decision shall be taken directly to the Supreme Court of the United States on an expedited
basis.  Id.
24. See Elizabeth Kingsley & John Pomeranz, A Crash at the Crossroads:  Tax and Campaign
Finance Laws Collide in Regulation of Political Activities of Tax-Exempt Organizations, 31 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 55, 91-98 (2004).  Many contributions of soft money were much bigger than the
donations of hard money.  McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 124 (2003).  For example, in 1996 the top five
corporate soft-money donors gave more than $9 million in soft money to the two national parties.  Id.  In
2000, the national parties raised almost $300 million (over 60% of their total soft-money fundraising) from
just 800 donors.  Id.  In the 2000 election cycle, thirty-five of the fifty largest soft-money donors gave more
than $100,000 to both parties.  Id. at 125 n.12.  These practices indicate that many corporate contributions
were motivated by a desire for access to candidates.  Id. at 124.
25. 540 U.S. at 137.
which they could only use federal hard money contributions to finance ads
that promote or attack federal candidates, regardless of whether the ads
expressly advocate the election or defeat of the candidate.20
If the bipartisan legislation becomes law, the 527 Reform Act’s effort to
regulate § 527 groups the same way BCRA regulates national parties and
officeholders must overcome the same constitutional hurdles as BCRA did in
McConnell.21  The 527 Reform Act will most likely be challenged as a
violation of the First Amendment rights of these organizations, and campaign
finance experts believe this issue would be taken by the Supreme Court.22  In
fact, McCain’s version of the 527 Reform Act introduced in the Senate on
February 2, 2005 provides for a special review process for any constitutional
challenge to the statute.23  Furthermore, if the expenditures of § 527 groups are
regulated similarly to the expenditures of national parties, then groups
organized under § 501 of the I.R.C. might become the next location for the
enormous amount of soft money raised and spent for federal elections.24  This
note will argue that the 527 Reform Act most likely will be upheld by the
Supreme Court under the deferential First Amendment standard set forth in
McConnell.25  However, this note will also proffer that any proposed attempt
to regulate § 501 organizations in the same manner likely will be held
unconstitutional.  Therefore, despite the best efforts of reformers like Senator
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26. See FED. ELECTION COMM’N, supra note 6.
McCain, soft money will continue to play a substantial role, in the 2006
federal elections and beyond, through the § 501 loophole.
Part I of this note will discuss BCRA’s elimination of the most drastic
evils of soft money’s effect on federal elections.  Building on this foundation,
Part II analyzes the Supreme Court’s decision in McConnell and the First
Amendment standard of review used by the Court in dealing with challenges
to Congress’s regulation of soft money contributions.  By scrutinizing the
recently introduced 527 Reform Act, Part III focuses on the role of § 527 and
§ 501 organizations in the 2004 federal elections and the current impetus for
regulating these groups.  Finally, Part IV applies the Court’s constitutional
standard in McConnell to the 527 Reform Act to predict whether such reforms
will be resistant to inevitable First Amendment challenges and whether § 501
groups will become the next major loophole through which unregulated soft
money flows into during the 2006 federal election cycle.  This paper
concludes that the 527 Reform Act will likely survive any First Amendment
challenges under the Supreme Court’s deferential standard articulated in
McConnell.  However, any legislative attempt to regulate § 501 organizations
in a similar fashion likely will be found unconstitutional under this same
standard.  Therefore, because the spending of § 527 groups will be subject to
strict FEC limitations, more soft money contributions are likely to flow into
§ 501 groups during the 2006 election cycle.  Thus, the 527 Reform Act will
not force unregulated campaign contributions out of the campaign finance
neighborhood entirely but rather redirect them to yet another new address.
I.  DEFINING SOFT MONEY AND THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT
OF 2002
A.  Soft Money—Unregulated Contributions Before BCRA
As noted above, soft money commonly refers to funds that are not subject
to FECA’s contribution limitations and may not be subject to federal
disclosure requirements depending on the sponsor.26  In response to a First
Amendment challenge to FECA over its caps and reporting requirements
imposed on political contributions, Buckley v. Valeo upheld all of the
disclosure and reporting requirements in the Act based on three important
state interests:  providing the electorate with relevant information about the
candidates and their supporters; deterring actual corruption and discouraging
450 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:445
27. 424 U.S. 1, 66-68 (1976).
28. Id. at 79-80.
29. Id. at 78.
30. Id. at 80.
31. Id.
32. Craig Holman, The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act:  Limits and Opportunities for Non-Profit
Groups in Federal Elections, 31 N. KY. L. REV. 243, 248 (2004).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 80.
36. Id. at 44-45.  These express words or phrases of advocacy of election or defeat included “vote
for,” “elect,” “support,” “cast your ballot for,” “Smith for Congress,” “vote against,” “defeat,” and “reject.”
Id. at 44 n.52.
37. Id. at 79-80.
the use of money for improper purposes; and facilitating enforcement of the
prohibitions of FECA.27  Furthermore, the Buckley Court placed a narrow
construction on the interpretations of the terms “contribution” and
“expenditure” as used in FECA in order to avoid overbreadth problems.28  The
Court defined a contribution as “money that is completely given over to
another entity, whether to a party, candidate campaign, or political action
committee.”29  In contrast, the Court defined an expenditure as “[f]unds used
for communications that expressly advocate the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate.”30  Finally, the Buckley Court held that campaign
advertisements were subject to campaign finance regulation while mere issue
ads were outside the realm of the FECA.31
As a result of FECA and the Buckley decision, candidates, parties and
groups were allowed to use only hard money to pay for advertisements that
expressly advocated the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.32
As stated above, the term “hard money” refers to money raised within the
source and contribution limitations of FECA and publicly disclosed to the
FEC.33  Also, under this regime, express advocacy was contrasted with “issue
advocacy,” which included communications by parties or groups intended to
influence a political issue, policy, or proposed legislation, but not to advocate
the election of candidates.34  Essentially issue ads fell outside the regulatory
authority as long as the ads did not use explicit words advocating the “election
or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.”35  The Buckley Court listed eight
words or phrases that made an ad an electioneering communication as opposed
to an educational ad that would be exempt from FECA regulation.36
Therefore, before BCRA, political advertisements could easily avoid
campaign finance regulations as long as they did not employ one of the
Buckley Court’s words or phrases.37
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38. Holman, supra note 32, at 244.
39. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
40. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002) (codified
at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431, 434 & 441a-441k (Supp. II 2002)).  President Bush called BCRA at the time of its
enactment, “the culmination of more than 6 years of debate among a vast array of legislators, citizens, and
groups.”  Statement on Signing the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, supra note 9, at 517.
[The] provisions of the bill will go a long way toward fixing some of the most pressing problems
in campaign finance today.  They will result in an election finance system that encourages greater
individual participation, and provides the public more accurate and timely information, than does
the present system.  All of the American electorate will benefit from these measures to strengthen
our democracy.
Id. at 517-18.
41. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, tit. I, §§ 101-103.  The pertinent sections of Title I
effectively ban soft money.  They provide that candidates for state and federal office, as well as national,
state, district, and local committees, may not:  “solicit, receive, or direct to another person a contribution,
donation, or transfer of funds or any other thing of value, or spend any funds, that are not subject to the
limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act.”  2 U.S.C. § 441i(a)(1) (Supp. II 2002).
Title I also explains that raising money for fundraising costs is now subject to regulation:  “An amount spent
by a person described in subsection (a) or (b) to raise funds that are used, in whole or in part, for
expenditures and disbursements for a Federal election activity shall be made from funds subject to the
limitations, prohibitions, and reporting requirements of this Act.”  Id. § 441i(c).
42. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, tit. II, §§ 201-204.  Title II, codified at 2 U.S.C.
§ 434(f), defines “electioneering communications” as:
any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which—(I) refers to a clearly identified candidate
for Federal office; (II) is made within—(aa) 60 days before a general, special, or runoff election for
the office sought by the candidate; or (bb) 30 days before a primary or preference election, or a
convention or caucus of a political party that has authority to nominate a candidate, for the office
sought by the candidate; and (III) in the case of a communication which refers to a candidate for an
office other than President or Vice President, is targeted to the relevant electorate.
2 U.S.C. § 434(f)(3) (Supp. II 2002).
43. Id. § 441i.
B.  BCRA—The Revolution in Campaign Finance
BCRA is widely considered the most significant campaign finance
legislation influencing federal elections in over twenty-five years.38  Federal
campaign finance law had long been governed by FECA.39  The passage of
BCRA culminated a seven-year effort by its congressional sponsors to
significantly amend FECA.40  BCRA’s two main amendments are the ban on
raising and spending soft money by the national parties, federal officeholders
and enumerated candidates,41 and the expansion of the definition of
“electioneering communications” that determine what constitutes a campaign
advertisement.42
Title I of BCRA also prohibits candidates or federal officeholders from
raising or spending soft money in connection with federal election activities.43
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44. Id.
45. Id. § 431.
46. Id. § 441i.
47. See Holman, supra note 32, at 257-58 (discussing various FEC regulations that allow a moderate
degree of soft money solicitation by federal officeholders and national parties).
48. Glen Justice, In New Landscape of Campaign Finance, Big Donations Flow to Groups, Not
Parties, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2003, at A41 (According to Senator Mitch McConnell, “[t]his law will not
remove one dime from politics. . . . Soft money is not gone, . . . it has just changed its address”) [hereinafter
In New Landscape].
49. 2 U.S.C. § 434.
50. Id. § 434(f)(3).
51. Id.
Included in Title I is a ban on raising soft money for other groups, except for
some limited activities of nonprofit groups.44  The term “federal election
activity” is defined rather broadly as any ad that promotes or attacks a federal
candidate, generic party activity, voter mobilization activity, and voter
registration drives inside of 120 days of a federal election.45  However, BCRA
allows candidates and federal officeholders to raise up to $20,000 in soft
money from individual contributions for voter mobilization activities of each
§ 527 or § 501(c) nonprofit group.46  Although subsequent FEC rulemaking
has mitigated the sweeping provisions imposed by BCRA,47 the 2002
legislation undoubtedly changed the way soft money is funneled into federal
election campaigns while not eliminating it completely.48
Title II of BCRA expanded the “electioneering communications”
definition in FECA to include more than the “magic words” given by the
Supreme Court in Buckley.49  The new provision now regulates any broadcast
ad that refers to a clearly identified federal candidate within sixty days of a
general election or thirty days of a primary election.50  Any electioneering
communication or express advocacy over $10,000 must be paid for with hard
money, and the source of funds and expenditures must be disclosed to the
FEC.51
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52. A sampling of the plaintiffs includes Senator Mitch McConnell; Representative Bob Barr;
Representative Mike Pence; Alabama Attorney General William H. Pryor; Libertarian National Committee,
Inc.; the Alabama Republican Executive Committee; the Libertarian Party of Illinois, Inc.; the DuPage
Political Action Council, Inc.; the Jefferson County Republican Executive Committee; American Civil
Liberties Union; Associated Builders and Contractors, Inc.; the Center for Individual Freedom; the Christian
Coalition of America, Inc.; Club for Growth, Inc.; Indiana Family Institute, Inc.; National Right to Life
Committee, Inc.; National Right to Life Educational Trust Fund; the National Right to Life Political Action
Committee; the National Right to Work Committee; 60 Plus Association, Inc.; Southeastern Legal
Foundation Inc.; U.S. d/b/a ProEnglish; Martin J. Connors; Thomas McInerney and Trevor M. Southerland.
See McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 220-21 n.55 (D.D.C. 2003).
53. Id. at 266.
54. Order Consolidating Cases, McConnell v. FEC, No. 02-582 (D.D.C. Apr. 24, 2002).
55. The panel included U.S. District Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, U.S. Circuit Judge Karen LeCraft
Henderson and U.S. District Judge Richard J. Leon.  See McConnell, 251 F. Supp. 2d at 177.
56. See 2 U.S.C. § 437(h) (Supp. II 2002).
57. See Charles Lane, Justices Split on Campaign Finance; Court Will Debate Case This Fall,
WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 2003, at A1.
58. Erwin Chemerinsky, Unanswered Questions, 7 GREEN BAG 2d 323, 329 (2004).
59. The decision in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), is the longest Supreme Court decision
in campaign finance history and the second longest in terms of word count, 89,694, surpassed only by the
1857 Dred Scott opinion, Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856), at 109,163 words.
Supreme Court McConnell Case Had Biggest Page Count of Any Opinion Issued by Supreme Court,
Money & Pol. Rep. (BNA) (Dec. 22, 2003).  However, the McConnell decision was the longest ruling by
the Supreme Court in terms of pages.  Id.  The opinion is almost 150 pages long in the Supreme Court
Reporter.  See McConnell v. FEC, 124 S. Ct. 619 (2003).
60. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act, 2 U.S.C. §§ 441(i), 434(f) (Supp. II 2002) (setting forth two
main pillars of BCRA).
II.  MCCONNELL V. FEC
Within days of the enactment of BCRA, eighty-four plaintiffs52 filed
eleven different lawsuits challenging the new campaign finance law arguing
that the soft-money ban and regulations on issue advocacy violated the First
Amendment.53  All the lawsuits were consolidated before a three-judge panel
of the United States District Court of the District of Columbia into
McConnell.54  This three-judge panel55 issued a mixed ruling in May 2003
which was stayed on appeal when the Supreme Court took the case on the fast-
track schedule provided for in BCRA.56  In order to hear this important case
before the start of the 2004 federal election cycle, the Supreme Court
uncharacteristically cut short its summer vacation to hear oral arguments.57
The Justices recognized that it was crucial to determine the rules for campaign
fundraising and spending as soon as possible.58
In a five-to-four decision,59 the Court upheld the two main pillars of
BCRA.60  Justices Stevens and O’Connor wrote the Opinion of the Court
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61. There is not a single majority opinion in McConnell.  See 540 U.S. at 114 (Stevens, J., and
O’Connor, J., writing the Opinion of the Court with respect to Titles I and II); 540 U.S. at 224 (Rehnquist,
C.J., writing the Opinion of the Court with respect to Titles III and IV); 540 U.S. at 233 (Breyer, J., writing
the Opinion of the Court with respect to Title V).  Most likely this splintered Opinion of the Court is
because of the extraordinary length of the opinion and the complexity of the issues.  See Chemerinsky,
supra note 58, at 329.
62. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 224.
63. The Court approved of every part of BCRA except for two provisions that banned campaign
contributions from minors, id. at 231-32, and the requirement that parties choose between making either
independent expenditures or coordinated expenditures on behalf of candidates.  Id. at 219-24.
64. Id. at 149-50.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See Holman, supra note 32, at 263.
68. See Keller, supra note 21.  Many campaign finance experts believe any § 527 legislation will
run into constitutional roadblocks.  Id.  Rick Hansen, a professor at Loyola Law School in Los Angeles who
specializes in campaign finance issues, said “I think ultimately, if these groups are regulated . . . it’s
probably going to be an issue that the Supreme Court takes up.”  Id.; see also Concerns Grow, supra note
22.
dealing with Titles I and II,61 which ruled that BCRA’s two principal,
complementary features—Congress’s effort to plug the soft-money loophole
and its regulation of electioneering communications—must be upheld in the
main.62  In addition, the Court supported nearly every element of BCRA and
of campaign finance reform in general.63  Most important to the 527 Reform
Act was the Court’s rejection of the very narrow justification for campaign
finance laws argued for by the plaintiffs that campaign finance regulations
were only justifiable to curtail the type of corruption that causes a change in
legislative votes.64  The Court held otherwise by stating that soft money not
only leads to more than just a possible change in legislative votes, but also to
“manipulations of the legislative calendar, leading to Congress’s failure to
enact, among other things, generic drug legislation, tort reform, and tobacco
legislation.”65  The Court opined that to claim that such legislative scheduling
changes do not influence legislative outcomes “surely misunderstands the
legislative process.”66  Therefore, according to the Supreme Court’s analysis,
future campaign finance legislation need not be based only upon this narrow
interpretation of soft money’s corrupting influence but may also be based on
the more subtle influences of money unregulated by FECA.67
This assertion is vital to determining whether the new 527 Reform Act
will withstand almost certain First Amendment challenges if it is enacted in
essentially the same form as Senator McCain’s proposal.68  Despite the
Court’s specific language upholding BCRA’s main provisions based on
“corruption” or the “appearance of corruption,” the Court importantly granted
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69. Holman, supra note 32, at 263.
70. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 137.
71. Id.
72. Chemerinsky, supra note 58, at 329; see generally Elisabeth Bumiller & Carl Hulse, Bush Picks
U.S. Appeals Judge to Take O’Connor’s Court Seat, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2005, at A1; Sheryl Gay Stolberg
& Elisabeth Bumiller, Senate Confirms Roberts as 17th Chief Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2005, at A1.
73. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000).
74. Id. § 170(a)(1).
75. Id. § 501(a).
76. Id. § 501(c)(3).  Other activities include the prevention of cruelty to animals or children and the
testing for public safety.  Id.
a great deal of deference to Congress to decide whether any given campaign
finance policy is sufficient to meet the corruption standard.69  The Court stated
that the “less rigorous standard of review we have applied to contribution
limits (Buckley’s “closely drawn” scrutiny) shows proper deference to
Congress’s ability to weigh competing constitutional interests in an area in
which it enjoys particular expertise.”70  Furthermore, Justices Stevens and
O’Connor explained in reference to the most important pillars of BCRA,
Titles I and II, that the Court’s deferential standard “provides Congress with
sufficient room to anticipate and respond to concerns about circumvention of
regulations designed to protect the integrity of the political process.”71  While
the Court upheld BCRA with sweeping language under a self-described
deferential First Amendment standard, it must be remembered that the Court
was sharply divided (5-4) on the most important issues and the recent addition
of two new Justices to the Court could mean a reconsideration of the First
Amendment analysis and the fate of future campaign finance legislation.72
III.  THE IMPACT OF § 527 AND § 501 NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS ON
FEDERAL ELECTIONS
A.  Types of Tax-Exempt Organizations
The most common type of tax-exempt organizations are those organized
under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).73  Groups registered under this Section receive tax-
deductible charitable contributions74 and are exempt from paying income tax
as an entity.75  According to this provision, the organizations are limited
entirely to religious, charitable, educational, scientific, literary, or other
similar activities.76  Therefore, these organizations mainly include educational
institutions, churches and other religious institutions, nonprofit health care
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77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. § 501(h).
80. Id. § 501(c)(4).
81. Id.
82. Id. § 170(c) (defining charitable contributions as excluding those to § 501(c)(4) groups); see
also Kingsley & Pomeranz, supra note 24, at 100-01.
83. I.R.C. § 501(c)(4).
84. Id. § 527.
85. Id. § 527(f).
86. Id. § 527.
87. Id. § 2501(a)(4).
88. Id. § 527(i).  Note that most political parties, campaigns, and PACs are classified for tax
purposes under I.R.C. § 527 but must register with the FEC as mandated by FECA as amended by the
BCRA.  See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, 2 U.S.C. § 441i (Supp. II 2002).
89. I.R.C. § 527(i).
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providers, and foundations.77  Groups organized under § 501(c)(3) are strictly
prohibited from intervening in campaigns for elected public office,78 but they
may lobby in a very limited capacity.79
Groups organized under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) are “social welfare
organizations” or “civic leagues” that may pursue a somewhat broader range
of lobbying, educational, and political activities.80  Section 501(c)(4) groups
resemble § 501(c)(3) organizations because they too are exempt from federal
taxes;81 however, contributions to § 501(c)(4) groups are implicitly not tax-
deductible.82  The “primary activities” of § 501(c)(4) entities must be actions
that benefit the public.83
Section 527 encompasses widely diverse categories of political
organizations that include incorporated or unincorporated independent
organizations,84 or PACs organized by a § 501(c) entity under § 527(f).85
Section 527 groups are usually exempt from federal income taxes86 and
contributions to § 527s are expressly exempted from gift and estate taxes.87
Section 527 organizations are not registered with the FEC, but must register
with the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”).88  Therefore even if such groups
do not disclose their contributions and expenditures to the FEC, they must file
periodic reports with the IRS.89  The IRS makes these periodic reports and
registrations available to the public.90
At least until the passage of the 527 Reform Act, § 527 groups may solicit
and spend money in federal elections, though not for express advocacy or
electioneering communications.91  This has made § 527 groups an alluring
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alternative for those who, during the 2004 election cycle, wished to use soft
money to promote and attack federal candidates since BCRA prohibited the
national committees and federal officeholders from doing the same.92
Therefore, even though the financial activities of § 527s are no longer as
hidden as before BCRA, the financial reports of these groups still do not need
to disclose which candidates are being targeted for election or defeat by the
election-related activities.93
B.  Section 527 Organizations and the 2004 Federal Elections
The Supreme Court warned about the impact of 527s in McConnell by
stating that “[g]iven BCRA’s tighter restrictions on the raising and spending
of soft money, the incentives for parties to exploit such organizations will only
increase.”94  Fearing the lack of legislative clarity on § 527 groups, numerous
groups petitioned the FEC in November 2003 to issue an advisory opinion
outlining the permissible uses of these entities.95  Some campaign watchdog
organizations also filed complaints with the FEC charging that many 527s
were being used in schemes to avoid the federal ban on soft money.96  The
FEC responded in a limited ruling in February 2004 which applied to only
527s that registered with the FEC and were already restricted to hard money.97
The most important decision by the FEC came on May 13, 2004, when it
announced that it would not impose new regulations on 527s for the remainder
of the 2004 federal campaign season.98  In response to the FEC decision, pro-
Republican groups were forced to match liberal 527s and form their own
organizations in order to utilize large quantities of soft money.99  Senator
McCain and his supporters have placed the blame for creating the § 527
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loophole squarely on the FEC and have defended BCRA against any perceived
deficiencies.100
For the 2003-04 election cycle, § 527 groups raised and spent over half
a billion dollars.101  Entities organized under § 527 supporting President Bush
raised in excess of $64 million and spent over $61 million, while 527s
supporting Senator John Kerry raised over $181 million and spent in excess
of $186 million.102  In 2004 alone, § 527 organizations raised a total of $434
million, which constituted $60 million more than for all of the previous three
years combined.103
Therefore, while BCRA seemed to achieve its main goal of campaign
finance reform—“removing unregulated and unlimited soft money from the
national parties and federal officeholders and candidates, where it poses the
greatest potential for corruption”—it seems to have only changed where the
battle is fought in the campaign financing war.104  This reality echoes Senator
McConnell’s statements immediately after the Supreme Court’s ruling on
BCRA in which he stated that “[s]oft money is not gone—it has just changed
its address.”105  Furthermore, the Supreme Court in McConnell likely was
correct in its admonition that soft money would never be completely banned
because “[m]oney, like water, will always find an outlet.”106
IV.  THE 527 REFORM ACT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
If the 527 Reform Act becomes law, it is likely to face a First Amendment
challenge.  A preliminary question to consider is why restrictions on soft
money contributions have anything to do with the First Amendment because
they do not seem to constitute direct governmental interference with speech
or the freedom of expression.  After this question is answered, it is necessary
2005] THE 527 REFORM ACT AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 459
107. Daniel R. Ortiz, The First Amendment at Work:  Constitutional Restrictions on Campaign
Finance Regulation, in CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM:  A SOURCEBOOK 63 (Anthony Corrado et al. eds.,
1997).
108. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
109. Id. at 19.
110. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972), amended
by Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 123 (1974).
111. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 11.
112. Id. at 20-21.
113. Id. at 78.
to consider how a federal court will apply the McConnell standard to this new
legislation.  Finally, since the 527 Reform Act will bar soft money from only
one type of nonprofit tax-exempt organization, it is essential to determine if
other entities, such as those formed under § 501(c)(3) and § 502(c)(4), will
take on a more significant role in the upcoming 2006 federal elections.
A.  Money as Speech
Of course the Constitution does not explicitly provide that the spending
of money could be considered a protected form of political speech, as noted
by Professor David Ortiz:
One would search the Constitution in vain for any mention of “campaign finance,” let
alone “contributions,” “expenditures,” “soft money,” or any of the other specialized terms
in the campaign finance vocabulary.  Yet despite this silence, the U.S. Supreme Court has
firmly and repeatedly held that the Constitution greatly limits what Congress and states
can do.  This is based on the belief that campaign finance regulations restrict political
expression and so implicate the First Amendment.107
In Buckley, the Court created the framework that guides what Congress
can and cannot restrict in the world of campaign finance.108  The Court, in
arguably the most important of its campaign finance reform cases, found that
money could find constitutional protection as being analogous to speech.109
Buckley dealt with a First Amendment challenge to many of the 1974
amendments to FECA.110  The challengers attacked the amendments’ limits on
various forms of election spending.111  While considering these challenges, the
Court created a critical dichotomy between “contributions” and
“expenditures.”112  A contribution was defined as money that is completely
given over to another entity, whether to a party, candidate campaign, or
political action committee.113  Essentially, a contribution occurs when the
donor retains no control over the future use of the money.  An expenditure, in
460 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67:445
114. Id. at 79.
115. Id. at 20-21.
116. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19.
117. Id. at 57.
118. Id. at 19.
119. Id. at 44-45.
120. J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the Constitution:  Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1004
(1976).
121. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 21.
contrast, was defined in Buckley as money given by “organizations that are
under the control of a candidate or the major purpose of which is the
nomination or election of a candidate.”114
The Court found that regulating expenditures raised more serious First
Amendment concerns than regulating contributions, because expenditures
convey the reasons why a spender supports or opposes a candidate.115  Thus,
limiting expenditures would necessarily restrict the quantity and quality of
political discourse.116  As the Court wrote:
In the free society ordained by our Constitution it is not the government, but the
people—individually as citizens and candidates and collectively as associations and
political committees—who must retain control over the quantity and range of debate on
public issues in a political campaign.117
. . . .
 . . . A restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political
communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by
restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of
the audience reached.118
The compelling governmental interest behind FECA, as articulated in
Buckley and in BCRA, was to prevent government corruption.119  The Court
said this interest was sufficient to leave the statute’s contribution limits in
place, but not the expenditure limits.  The Court “struck down all the spending
ceilings—on independent expenditures in [or on] behalf of a candidate, on
personal funds spent by a candidate in his [or her] own campaign, and on total
outlays by the candidate.”120  The Court concluded that, unlike contribution
limitations, the expenditure ceilings failed sufficiently to serve the
governmental interest in preventing corruption and that the burden they placed
on “core First Amendment expression” was unconstitutional.121  Therefore, the
Court recognized that “money is equal to speech, and that maxim was not
simply a theoretical construct in political discourse but instead had a very real
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impact on the ‘quantity and diversity of political speech.’”122  This decision
is consistent with other Supreme Court rulings on “symbolic speech.”
“Symbolic speech” refers to actions or conduct having strong First
Amendment protection as mere extensions of pure protected speech.123  In
Spence v. Washington, for example, the Court considered the issue of when
conduct should be regarded as communicative conduct.124  This case dealt with
an individual who taped a peace sign on an American flag after the killing of
students at Kent State University and subsequently was convicted of violating
a state law prohibiting flag desecration.125  The Court reversed the conviction
and found that the act was speech protected under the First Amendment.126
The opinion emphasized two factors in concluding that the conduct was
communicative:  “An intent to convey a particularized message was present,
and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the
message would be understood by those who viewed it.”127  Examples of such
actions have included refusing to salute the U.S. flag,128 declining to say the
Pledge of Allegiance,129 the wearing of an armband to protest a war,130
displaying a flag,131 and the burning of the United States flag.132  To be
protected under the First Amendment, this type of speech “need not convey
a ‘narrow, succinctly articularly message,’ nor even any ‘particularized
message’ in order to merit protection.”133  The Supreme Court has given
sweeping protection to such symbolic speech even when it conveys only the
most general message.134  Bradley A. Smith, a former Commissioner of the
FEC, has concluded that the spending of money on political campaigns
constitutes this type of protected symbolic speech:
Given this case history over many years, it is too late, really, to argue that a gift of money
is not a form of protected symbolic speech, at least when made to a political candidate.
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Such a gift is an action intended to convey support for a candidate and, it is generally
presumed, his or her views.135
Arguably the most prominent challenge to the “money as speech”
principle was that campaign giving was largely conduct with only an
incidental speech element.  Under this argument, campaign giving can and
should be regulated under the principles announced by the Supreme Court in
United States v. O’Brien.136  The issue in O’Brien was “whether an individual
could be prosecuted for burning his draft card as a protest against the Vietnam
War, or whether . . . [his] act was protected under the First Amendment as
symbolic speech.”137  The Court agreed with O’Brien’s contention that
burning his draft card was “symbolic speech.”138  However, it upheld
O’Brien’s conviction for destroying his draft card by holding that symbolic
speech could be restricted where such restrictions furthered a significant
government interest, provided that the interest was unrelated to the
suppression of free expression and the “incidental” restriction on First
Amendment freedoms was “no greater than essential.”139
Those who favor campaign finance regulation have used the O’Brien
decision to justify judicial deference to legislative limits on political
expenditures and contributions.  They contend that “like O’Brien’s draft card,
the money at stake in political giving is merely a vehicle for political
expression, not political expression itself.”140  Furthermore, reformers contend
that if this is true, such speech may be regulated under legislation that serves
an important government interest.  Advocates conclude that a law that targets
money, rather than speech directly, should therefore be subjected to a less
rigorous level of judicial scrutiny.
B.  McConnell v. FEC’s Deferential First Amendment Standard Applied to
the 527 Reform Act
The McConnell Court stated that the “less rigorous standard of review we
have applied to contribution limits . . . shows proper deference to Congress’s
decision to weigh competing constitutional interests in an area in which it
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150. Kingsley & Pomeranz, supra note 24, at 114.
enjoys particular expertise.”141  As discussed previously, the Supreme Court
in McConnell refused to limit Congress’s ability to regulate soft money’s
corruptive or apparently corruptive influence in federal elections based on the
First Amendment.142  Although the Court’s discussion of BCRA’s main
provisions was phrased in the language of the State’s interest in preventing
“corruption” or even the “appearance of corruption,” and although the Court
said strict scrutiny was applicable, the Court importantly expressed a great
deal of deference to Congress to decide whether any given campaign finance
policy was sufficient to meet the corruption standard.143
Even under this watered-down strict scrutiny standard, if the 527 Reform
Act is to survive a constitutional challenge it must be found to advance a
compelling governmental purpose.144  Therefore, the Court must deem the
government’s interest vital or “compelling” and the law must be “necessary”
as a means to accomplishing that compelling end.145  When this test is applied,
the government must show proof that the law is the least restrictive or least
discriminatory alternative.  If the law does not clear this hurdle, it is not
“necessary” to accomplish the end.146
Under the strict scrutiny test, the government bears the burden of proof,
such that the law will be struck down unless the government can show that the
law is necessary to accomplish a compelling government purpose.147
However, although strict scrutiny is normally the most intensive type of
judicial review, and laws are generally declared unconstitutional when it is
applied,148 the McConnell Court’s version of strict scrutiny was more
deferential to Congress than the Court’s regular application.149
The effort by Congress, in the 527 Reform Act, to bring all § 527
organizations under FECA’s restrictions on political committees would seek
to regulate a wide range of activities that are arguably protected under the
First Amendment.150  In so doing, the legislation would likely be subject to the
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same strict scrutiny standard applied to the soft money ban for federal
officeholders and national committees in McConnell.151  Furthermore, the IRS
has been explicit in recognizing that its standards for identifying political
activity by tax-exempt organizations capture far more activity than is regulated
under federal election law.152  In the context of federal races, there are many
activities that the I.R.C. recognizes as § 527 exempt function activities that
would “lead the IRS to classify an organization as a 527,” but may be “beyond
the constitutional reach of FECA.”153  However, given the massive flow of soft
money that was diverted from national parties and federal officeholders to
527s in the 2004 election cycle,154 and the appearance that § 527 organizations
are now the new face of corruption in national politics,155 the 527 Reform Act
likely will withstand a First Amendment challenge.  Senator McCain’s version
of the 527 Reform Act seems to have bipartisan support in Congress,156 and
under McConnell’s “less rigorous standard of review” in applying a First
Amendment strict scrutiny analysis in which the Court will show “proper
deference” to Congress, the 527 Reform Act will withstand any constitutional
challenges.157
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C.  Section 501(c) Organizations After the 527 Reform Act:  Soft Money’s
New Address
The 527 Reform Act explicitly says that the provisions of the reform
legislation “shall not be construed as affecting the determination of whether
a group organized under § 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is a
political committee” under FECA.158  This is noteworthy because, even under
the Court’s deferential First Amendment standard in McConnell, a complete
soft-money ban on § 501(c) groups would probably be unconstitutional
because, for reasons discussed previously, the vast majority of unregulated
campaign contributions have flowed through 527s and not 501s.159  Therefore,
since there is little “compelling need” to warrant this infringement on
otherwise protected First Amendment expression embodied in the § 501(c)
organizations’ activities and no “appearance of corruption” on par with that
of 527s, campaign finance reformers likely calculated that legislation going
after § 501(c) groups immediately would not pass constitutional muster.160
Therefore, the 527 Reform Act will probably not disturb the reporting
requirements in place for § 501(c)(3) or § 501(c)(4) organizations, at least
before the 2006 federal elections, without unexpected additional legislation.161
As discussed earlier, § 501(c)(3) groups must be engaged in religious,
educational, charitable, scientific, literary, or similar activities.162  Some
groups have successfully argued that because education is an exempt activity
for § 501(c)(3) groups, some quasi-political activities are allowable.163  The
IRS has contributed to the confusion by stating that “[s]ometimes . . . the
activity is both—it is education but it also constitutes intervention in a
political campaign.”164
Also, as discussed previously, § 501(c)(4) organizations are permitted to
have limited involvement in political campaigns so long as they are primarily
engaged in nonpolitical activities advancing social welfare.165  It might seem
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obvious that, if the 527 Reform Act is passed, § 501(c)(4) groups would be
more attractive than § 501(c)(3) organizations for people seeking to use soft
money to influence a federal election because of this limited involvement
allowance.166  However, contributors to § 501(c)(4) groups are subject to gift
taxation whereas contributions to § 527 organizations are not.167
This drawback has not prevented political organizations from coming up
with various ways to capitalize on the § 501(c)(4) allowance of a limited
involvement in political activity in the past.168  If § 527 groups are required to
register with the FEC as provided by the 527 Reform Act, political
organizations and candidates may elect to channel political advocacy through
a social welfare organization formed under § 501(c)(4), and thereby shield
contributions from FECA disclosure.169  Furthermore, § 501(c)(4) groups may
attempt to slip into the § 501(c)(3) educational exemption.170  Also, candidates
for federal office or other organizations may engage in a complicated shell
game of § 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4) groups to evade IRS and FEC restrictions
on exempt activities.171  The most egregious example of this practice may be
when a corporate or individual donor transfers funds to a § 501(c)(3) group
under the guise that it is involved in exempt educational activity and then
directs the money to a § 501(c)(4) group which in turn contributes it directly
to the candidate.  Under this arrangement, the contributor would get a
deduction, the § 501(c) organization would remain tax exempt, and the
candidate could spend the money.  Therefore, despite BCRA and the 527
Reform Act’s best efforts, the FEC will continue to play a vital role in
regulating soft money’s influence on federal elections because § 501(c)(3) and
§ 501(c)(4) organizations likely will play a huge role in the upcoming 2006
federal election cycle.172
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CONCLUSION
Senator McCain’s bipartisan 527 Reform Act is the latest congressional
effort to eliminate the corruptive effects of unregulated contributions
influencing elections for federal office.173  If enacted, the 527 Reform Act will
require § 527 groups to register as PACs with the FEC and comply with
federal campaign finance laws.174  Under this new reform legislation, § 527
groups can only use federal hard money contributions to finance ads that
promote or attack federal candidates, regardless of whether the ads expressly
advocate the election or defeat of the candidate.175  Just like Congress’s last
legislative reform effort of BCRA enacted in 2002,176 the key provisions of the
527 Reform Act will face inevitable First Amendment challenges,177 because
the law will regulate political donations that have been interpreted as
expression protected under the Constitution.178  However, under the Supreme
Court’s deferential First Amendment standard given in the most recent
campaign finance reform case,179 the 527 Reform Act likely will withstand any
First Amendment challenges.180  Nevertheless, the 527 Reform Act will be far
from the panacea for all the supposed problems soft money introduces into
federal elections.  If the 527 Reform Act is enacted, it is likely to channel
considerably more unregulated contributions into a complicated shell game of
§ 501(c)(3) and § 501(c)(4) groups during the 2006 federal election cycle and
beyond.181  Thus, congressional campaign reform supporters will need to
propose additional legislation to deal with the supposed corruptive influences
of soft money in yet another arena.
